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INTRODUCTION 
Providing prenatal health care for working poor and immigrant 
women is a worthy goal, which the Bush Administration should strive 
to meet, but the Administration’s recent regulation redefining “child” 
under its State Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”)1 to 
                                                          
∗  The author is a former trial attorney with the United States Department of 
Justice, Civil Division, and current lecturer in the areas of law, government, public 
policy, and business at the Orfalea College of Business, California Polytechnic State 
University, San Luis Obispo and Cuesta College.  She dedicates this article to her 
children: Benjamin and Clara. 
 1. See State Children’s Health Insurance Program, Eligibility for Prenatal Care 
and Other Health Services for Unborn Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,956 (Oct. 2, 2002) 
[hereinafter Program] (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 457) (expanding the definition of 
children covered under SCHIP to allow unborn children to be considered “targeted 
low-income child[ren]”). 
1
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include the unborn undermines the tenets of Roe v. Wade2 without 
providing any tangible benefits to uninsured women and their 
unborn children.  This Article examines the legal, political, and 
medical implications of the recent change announced by President 
George W. Bush and the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) to expand its definition of child under SCHIP to begin at 
conception and continue until age nineteen.3  In addition, HHS 
announced that this coverage applies to all unborn children, 
regardless of the pregnant woman’s immigration status.4  This change 
may allow a court to find fertilized eggs, fetuses, and embryos entitled 
to the status of born children and thus the entire constitutional rights 
which accompany personhood without resulting in significant 
increases in prenatal care for pregnant women.5 
Part I provides a brief background of the SCHIP program and its 
successes and failures throughout its first five years.6  Part II addresses 
the potential effects of the new definition of child on legal precedents 
and how it relates to the concept of child as defined by courts and 
legislatures in other areas of the law.7  Part III explains how the new 
definition is doomed to fail at providing prenatal care for uninsured 
women and their unborn children because of SCHIP’S lack of 
additional funding and also the conflict it creates between the woman 
and the unborn child.8  Part IV discusses the highly charged political 
climate in which the change was announced, while part V, proposes 
some alternative routes the Administration could have taken to 
actually provide prenatal care to uninsured poor and immigrant 
women without entering the quagmire of when life begins.9  Finally, 
                                                          
 2. 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (finding that unborn persons “represent only the 
potentiality of life”). 
 3. See generally Press Release, United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, HHS to Allow States to Provide SCHIP Coverage for Prenatal Care: Would 
Allow Use of Existing Resources to Expand Prenatal Care Immediately (Jan. 31, 2002) 
(justifying the decision to include the age of nineteen years as necessary to provide 
prenatal healthcare to women). 
 4. See Program, supra note 1, at 61,966 (stating that the exclusion of children 
from coverage based on immigrant status would be contrary to SCHIP’s purpose of 
providing care to children). 
 5. See Dawn Miller, SCHIP Change Won’t Help State Expand Prenatal 
Coverage, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 28, 2002, at 2A (commenting on SCHIP’s lack 
of funding as the major impediment to expanding prenatal care).  But see Program, 
supra note 1, at 61,963 (arguing that regulation will allow more women to obtain 
prenatal care). 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
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the Article concludes that the decision to expand the definition of 
child to include the unborn is a bold step into the abortion rights 
controversy aimed at emboldening abortion rights opponents and 
attracting Hispanic voters in an election year, and also to serve as a 
step toward overturning Roe v. Wade without providing any 
substantial benefits to pregnant low income and immigrant women.10 
I.  THE SCHIP PROGRAM 
In 1997, Congress created SCHIP as part of its Balanced Budget 
Act11 in a bipartisan attempt to provide health insurance coverage for 
the approximately eleven million children whose families were unable 
to qualify for Medicare because their family’s income was above the 
Federal Poverty Level yet were unable to afford private health 
insurance.12  SCHIP was enacted in response to a disturbing increase 
in the number of uninsured children in families earning between 
100% and 150% of the federal poverty level.13  The level of uninsured 
children was deemed a serious national concern, particularly for 
certain minority children.14  Early health care coverage for children is 
an important public policy goal for “it impacts their ability to learn, 
their ability to thrive, and their ability to become productive members 
of society.”15  Thus, government officials proudly touted SCHIP as “a 
landmark opportunity to improve children’s health.”16 
                                                          
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397hh (subch. XXI) (1997) (proposing and defining 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program). 
 12. See id. at § 1397aa (declaring that the goal of this section is to allow states to 
provide for health assistance coverage for “uninsured, low-income children”); see also 
Lisa J. Andeen, Note, Improving Health Care for Uninsured Children in the Wake of 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 27 J. LEGIS. 299, 303-04 
(2001) (noting that more than one-half of uninsured children come from families 
whose incomes were above the federal poverty level); New Data: Nearly 5 Million 
Children in America are Needlessly Uninsured: HHS Sec. Thompson Helps Kick Off 
Enrollment Drive, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 22070112 
[hereinafter New Data] (quoting Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Kennedy 
regarding the importance of SCHIP). 
 13. See MARGO ROSENBACH ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATE CHILDREN’S 
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM: MOMENTUM IS INCREASING AFTER A MODEST START, FIRST 
ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (2001) (calculating that 27.8% of children between 100% and 
150% of the poverty level were uninsured between 1993 and 1997 before SCHIP was 
implemented). 
 14. See New Data, supra note 12 (reporting that African-American and Latino 
children are significantly affected by the lack of insurance). 
 15. Extension of Remarks at the Introduction of the MediKids Health Insurance 
Act of 2000, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Congressman Pete Stark), available at 
http://www.house.gov/stark/documents/106th/medikidssumm.html. 
 16. Administrator Health Care Financing Administration on the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program Before the Senate Finance Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) 
[hereinafter Senate Finance] (testimony of Nancy-Ann Deparle), available at 
3
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Under SCHIP, the federal government gives a portion or full 
coverage to states to provide healthcare coverage to uninsured 
children who are: 1) not eligible for Medicare, 2) under age nineteen, 
and 3) in families where household income is at or below 200% of the 
Federal Poverty Level or a percentage not higher than fifty points 
above the state Medicaid eligibility requirements.17  Family coverage, 
including prenatal care, was also available to parents meeting the 
income requirements if the states sought and were granted a waiver 
from the Secretary of Health and Human Services.18  The statute 
outlines that the states may provide SCHIP coverage through an 
expanded Medicaid program, a state created health insurance 
program, or “a combination of both.”19  Currently, every state and 
territory has a SCHIP plan with twenty-one states operating Medicaid 
expansion programs, sixteen states conducting separate SCHIP 
programs, and nineteen states operating combination plans.20 
Experts credit SCHIP with turning the trend of increasing rates of 
uninsured children around and providing much needed health 
insurance to previously uninsured children.21  Since its enactment, 
SCHIP has provided insurance coverage for millions of children.22  It 
began slowly with states covering 982,000 children in 1998, but 
quickly evolved to covering nearly 4.6 million children under SCHIP 
at some point during 2001.23  While its rapid expansion created 
                                                          
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/testimony.asp?Counter=565. 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj, (subch. XXI) (1997) (defining the requirements for 
eligibility for “targeted low-income children” under SCHIP); see also THE 2002 HHS 
POVERTY GUIDELINES: ONE VERSION OF THE [U.S.] FEDERAL POVERTY MEASURE 
(establishing the 2002 Federal Poverty Level for a family of four as $36,300), available 
at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/02poverty.htm (last updated Sept. 11, 2003). 
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (subch. XI) (1997) (outlining the circumstances 
in which waivers may be granted). 
 19. Id. at § 1397aa(a)(1)-(2). 
 20. JENNIFER M. RYAN, SCHIP TURNS FIVE: TAKING STOCK, MOVING AHEAD 2 (2002), 
available at http://www.njpf.org/pdfs_ib_IB781_SCHIP5_8-15-02.pdf; see also CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., STATE CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM PLAN 
ACTIVITY MAP, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/chip-map-asp (last visited Aug. 13, 
2002). 
 21. See Robert J. Mills, Health Insurance Coverage: 2001: Consumer Income 
(Sept. 2002) (noting that the actual number of uninsured children below the age of 
eighteen did not change between 2000 and 2001), available at http://www.census. 
gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-220.pdf. 
 22. See RYAN, supra note 20, at 3 (illustrating the strong growth trend in the 
number of children enrolled in SCHIP). 
 23. See Senate Finance, supra note 16 (describing the upward trend in SCHIP’s 
enrollment); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., THE STATE CHILDREN’S 
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM ANNUAL ENROLLMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2001: 
OCTOBER 1, 2000-SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 (highlighting a 38% increase in the number of 
children enrolled in SCHIP during fiscal year 2001), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/schip01.pdf. 
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health care coverage for many, a 2002 study showed that 
approximately five million children who were eligible for SCHIP 
coverage were still not enrolled.24 
Despite its success in providing health care coverage to the children 
of the working poor and the need to continue to expand the program 
to the millions of eligible children still not enrolled, SCHIP funding 
and thus coverage is scheduled to decline in the future.25  When 
Congress enacted SCHIP, it provided $4.3 billion for the years 1998-
2001, but as part of the budget balancing act, Congress decreased 
funding for the following years to $3.15 billion.26  This decrease in 
funding comes at a time when many states are also facing the worst 
budget shortfalls since World War II and having to limit their own 
funding of low income health programs such as Medicaid.27  
Currently, the states contribute about 30% of the SCHIP funding and 
the federal government contributes the remaining 70%.28  The 
SCHIP dip and state budget woes are causing many states to cut back 
on their SCHIP programs and creating crisis situations in other 
areas.29 
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes that due to the 
26% reduction in federal SCHIP monies and increasing SCHIP 
enrollments, twenty states will be unable to maintain their current 
enrollments.30  The Office of Management and Budget has estimated 
that as many as 900,000 children will no longer be covered due to the 
                                                          
 24. See New Data, supra note 12 (noting that the enrollment of children in 
SCHIP and Medicaid for health insurance coverage would decrease by one-half the 
number of uninsured children in the U.S.). 
 25. See RYAN, supra note 20, at 4 (documenting the 26% decrease in federal 
funding available to states between 2002 and 2004). 
 26. See id. (raising the possibility that the SCHIP dip could result in 
approximately one million children losing their SCHIP coverage). 
 27. Robert Pear, States Are Facing Big Fiscal Crisis, Governor’s Report, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at A1 (reporting that unclaimed federal funds allocated to the 
states were reverted back to the Treasury Department, resulting in a $1.2 billion loss 
to states for health insurance coverage for children covered by SCHIP). 
 28. See Press Release, United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
States May Provide SCHIP Coverage For Prenatal Care, New Rule to Expand Health 
Care Coverage for Babies, Mothers (Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Press Release] 
(referring to SCHIP’s $40 billion budget), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/ 
press/2002pres/20020927a.html. 
 29. See infra section IV(A). 
 30. See EDWIN PARK ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, OMB 
ESTIMATES THAT 900,000 CHILDREN WILL LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE FUNDING DUE TO 
REDUCTIONS IN FEDERAL SCHIP FUNDING: CONGRESS COULD EXTEND THE AVAILABILITY 
OF EXPIRING SCHIP FUNDS AND UNDO THE REDUCTION IN SCHIP FUNDING LEVELS TO 
AVERT A LARGE ENROLLMENT DECLINE 4-7 (2002) (drawing attention to the likelihood 
of future state SCHIP spending exceeding state and federal funding), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/7-15-02health.pdf. 
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decreased funding.31  For example, Oklahoma, faced by severe 
budget shortfalls, has greatly reduced the number of SCHIP eligible 
children in the state by changing the eligibility requirements from as 
much as 185% above the federal poverty level to 115%.32 
Another $1.6 billion33 to $2.8 billion in unspent federal funds 
reverted back to the United States Treasury at the end of 2003.34  This 
reversion occurred because SCHIP requires a state to use its allotment 
of federal funding within three years and, if any money remains 
unused, the funds are reallocated to states that already used their 
allotments.35  Any money left over after one more year returns to the 
Treasury.36  Texas, for example, relinquished more than $285 million 
to other states because it could not afford to contribute its part of the 
funding.37  In an attempt to alleviate the funding shortfall, Congress 
has introduced several bills over the last few years to provide prenatal 
and postpartum services to women and children, including immigrant 
children and optional care, however, none of the measures has 
passed.38  Thus, the Bush administration’s decision to expand SCHIP 
coverage to unborn children increases the number of eligible 
                                                          
 31. See id. at 11 (arguing that returning expired funds to the states and providing 
full federal funding will enable many states to avoid this drop in SCHIP enrollment). 
 32. See IRIS J. LAW, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE FISCAL 
CONDITIONS CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE BADLY NEEDED 2 (2002) 
(stating that, because of the reduction in SCHIP eligible children, “these changes 
nearly eliminate Oklahoma’s SCHIP program”), available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-
20-02sfp.pdf. 
 33. See Amy Goldstein, Children’s Health Plan at Center of Dispute, Rules May 
Forces States to Drop Enrollees, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2002, at A33 (addressing the 
fact that this is part of a general funding problem with SCHIP, as states began their 
SCHIP programs with a significant abundance of funding and are now facing budget 
deficits because of the rapid increase in the number of enrollees in their programs). 
 34. See ROSENBACH ET AL., supra note 13, at 5 (finding that these much needed 
funds were unused due to several factors, generally revolving around issues states had 
in implementing their programs). 
 35. See id. (noting another problem with SCHIP’s funding structure, which has 
created SCHIP’s budget shortfall). 
 36. See id. (explaining the reason for the billion dollar return of funds to the 
Treasury Department). 
 37. See Karen Masterson, Texas Loses Millions in Health Care Funds: Other 
States to Receive Unused Money, [corrected Oct. 17, 2002], HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 
16, 2002, at A1 (finding that because Texas did not use all of its funds, its portion of 
SCHIP funding between 2002 and 2004 diminished by $200 million). 
 38. See Start Healthy, Stay Healthy Act of 2003, S. 1033, 108th Cong. (2003) 
(providing states with the opportunity to increase coverage of “certain women” and 
children); see also Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act of 2001, S. 582, 
107th Cong. (2001) (stating as its primary purpose the coverage of “certain legal 
immigrants,” including pregnant women and children); Mothers and Newborns 
Health Insurance Act of 2001, H.R. 2610, 107th Cong. (2001) (advocating “coverage 
of pregnancy related assistance for targeted low-income pregnant women,” and 
“automatic enrollment of children” whose mothers receive such assistance). 
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recipients under SCHIP at a time when there is not enough state or 
federal funding to cover the currently eligible recipients.39  
II.  REDEFINING CHILD 
A.  The New Regulation 
On September 27, 2002, less than six weeks prior to the pivotal 
November 6, 2002 election where Republicans retained control of the 
House and regained control of the Senate, HHS Secretary Tommy G. 
Thompson first announced the new SCHIP definition of child to 
include “an individual under the age of 19 including the period from 
conception to birth.”40  Conception is typically deemed the moment 
when a male reproductive cell, the sperm, unites with the female 
reproductive cell, the egg.41  Once the fertilized cell divides, it is 
called an embryo until the eighth week when it is called a fetus.42  
Thus, this new definition characterizes fertilized eggs, embryos, and 
fetuses as children.43 The new rule was published in the Federal 
Register on October 2, 2002 and came into effect on November 1, 
2002.44 
While announcing the change, Thompson stated that “Prenatal 
care is one of the most important investments that we can make to 
ensure the long-term good health of our children and their 
mothers.”45  Some hailed the change as intended to assist pregnant 
low-income women46 while others saw it as a thinly veiled attempt to 
begin building a legal case to overturn Roe v. Wade.47 
                                                          
 39. See Miller, supra note 5, at 2A (noting that if the state must enroll more 
children, it will require additional funding). 
 40. See Press Release, supra note 28, at http://hhs.gov.news.press.2002pres/ 
20020927a.html. 
 41. J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER Z-17, Vol. 
6, (2000). 
 42. See id. at E-67 and F-62. 
 43. See Press Release, supra note 28, at (incorporating conception in the 
definition of childhood). 
 44. See Program, supra note 1, at 61,956 (explaining the reason for expanding 
the definition of child). 
 45. See Press Release, supra note 28. 
 46. See Vicki Kemper, The Nation White House Issues Regulation That Defines 
Fetuses as Children, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at A23 (mentioning the National 
Right to Life Committees’ support for the new rule). 
 47. See Joan Ryan, Pre-emptive Strike on Roe vs. Wade, THE S.F. CHRON., Oct. 1, 
2002, at A17; see also Pear, supra note 27, at A13 (mentioning Roe and the 
disapproval of Planned Parenthood regarding the regulation). 
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The controversy is fueled because rather than simply extending the 
SCHIP program to provide prenatal care to eligible women, this 
regulation actually takes on the very definition of child, and as such 
the much debated question of when life begins and what rights the 
unborn possesses.48  Furthermore, by providing care for the fetus as a 
separate entity from the pregnant woman, the new definition gives 
individual status and rights to the unborn child, which brings the 
unborn child closer to the status of a person.  If the unborn are 
persons, then they should be entitled to the full panoply of legal 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  This goal of slowly gaining 
personhood for the unborn as an attack on abortion rights, as 
outlined by Roe, was acknowledged by Samuel B. Casey, Executive 
Director of the anti-abortion group of the Christian Legal Society, 
when he stated: “In as many areas as we can, we want to put on the 
books that the embryo is a person.  That sets the stage for a jurist to 
acknowledge that human beings at any stage of development deserve 
protection, even protection that would trump a woman’s interest in 
terminating a pregnancy.”49  This tactic is clearly consistent with 
Supreme Court statements regarding what it will take for the Court to 
go beyond the doctrine of stare decisis and overrule Roe.50 
B.  Judicial Treatment of the Unborn 
For centuries, judges and legislators struggled to define what rights 
the unborn possess.  This struggle has led to variations in the legal 
status of the unborn from “jurisdiction to jurisdiction, from context to 
context.”51  Courts and legislatures have considered such weighty 
issues as whether the mother and unborn child are one or two 
entities, and whether standing to sue should be based on whether the 
injury occurred before or after viability or only when followed by a live 
birth. 
Originally, under the common law, unborn children “were not 
given any rights until birth.”52  In 1884, Justice Oliver Wendell 
                                                          
 48. See Erin P. George, Comment, The Stem Cell Debate: The Legal, Political 
and Ethical Issues Surrounding Federal Funding of Scientific Research on Human 
Embryos, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 747, 748 (2002) (noting that “people have been 
grappling with the legal, ethical and moral issues surrounding human embryos since 
early English common law”). 
 49. Aaron Zitner, Abortion Foes Attack Rose on New Research, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 2003, at A1. 
 50. See infra section III(B) and accompanying notes. 
 51. BONNIE STEINBECK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF 
EMBRYOS AND FETUSES 4 (1992). 
 52. See George, supra note 48 at 759. 
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Holmes relied on the lack of common law precedent, the remoteness 
of the injury to a fetus, and the fact that the unborn child was still a 
part of its mother to hold that there was no duty of care owed to an 
unborn child for wrongful death.53  Laws were later changed to allow 
unborn children to have some rights, based on injuries or bequests 
made while they were in utero and were subsequently born alive.  
However, they still did not possess the right to an action in civil 
court.54 
Today, courts in over thirty-six states and the District of Columbia 
allow wrongful death actions for stillborn children where the injuries 
occur after viability.55  Ten state courts allow recovery in wrongful 
death actions where there was a live birth.56 
Two of these states denied a cause of action under the wrongful 
death statutes to the representative of the unborn child, but gave the 
parents a right to recover for the child’s wrongful death.57 
In fact, all states, which have considered the issue, and the federal 
government, allow recovery in tort for prenatal injuries if the injured 
is subsequently “born alive.”58  In property law, courts have also been 
willing to recognize bequests made to unborn children if the children 
are subsequently born alive.59 
In criminal law, courts have looked at whether the victim was born 
alive in determining whether the victim sustained actionable 
injuries.60 More than twenty states recognize some form of criminal 
                                                          
 53. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15-17 (1884). 
 54. See George, supra note 48, at 760. 
 55. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (West 1982); Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Hartford Ins. Group, 747 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying California law); Walker 
by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (dictum in wrongful life 
action); Keleman v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 566, 568 (Ct. App. 1982) (prenatal 
injury); Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The flight From Reason 
In the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 49 (1993) (citing Wolfe v. 
Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758, 761 (Ala. 1973) (express statement in context of wrongful 
death action)). 
 56. See Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Stern v. Miller, 
348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Simon 
v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 759, 761 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (applying Florida law); 
Linton, supra note 55 at 49 (citing Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977)). 
 57. See Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) (by court rule); Giardina v. 
Bennett, 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988) (common law). 
 58. See Michael Holzapfel, Comment, The Right to Live: The Right to Choose, 
and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 431, 447 
(2002); see also United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 59. See, e.g., In re Will of Holthausen, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (1941); see also 
Cowles v. Cowles, 13 A. 414, 417 (Conn. 1887). 
 60. See Holzapfel, supra note 58, at 433-34. 
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liability for injuries sustained in the womb.61  For example, if a child, 
born alive, dies from injuries sustained while in the womb, some states 
allow homicide actions.62  However, absent an expression of legislative 
intent to do otherwise, thirty-three state courts have held that an 
unborn child is not a “person,” “human being,” or an “other” under 
their states’ murder, vehicular homicide, and manslaughter statutes.63  
Courts have been willing to recognize legal rights for injuries and 
bequests made to the unborn, but such rights are typically contingent 
upon the unborn child successfully entering this world.  No courts 
claimed to base these rights on the status of the unborn as a person in 
their own right prior to birth. 
In addition to the born-alive rule, courts also rely on the issue of 
viability in determining standing to sue in civil suits on behalf of the 
unborn.64  Courts have defined viability as the time when there is “a 
reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival outside the 
womb, with or without artificial support.”65  Fetuses typically reach 
viability between the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth week of 
gestation.66  The Bonbrest v. Katz opinion in 1946, was the first time a 
federal court held that a fetus was a separate entity from the pregnant 
woman, and should have standing to sue in its own right. 67  Bonbrest 
held that at viability the fetus has all the characteristics of a human 
being and thus should be entitled to the full panoply of civil rights.68  
Thus, the evolving law provides fetuses with property rights, wrongful 
death claims, the protection of criminal laws, and the right to sue in 
civil courts if they were born alive or reached the point of viability.69  
In 1973, however, the Supreme Court decided what was to be the 
benchmark for all laws and cases to come involving the unborn in the 
abortion case of Roe vs. Wade.70 
                                                          
 61. See id. 
 62. See Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A 
Survey of Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Further State 
Applications, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1845, 1851 (2000). 
 63. See Linton, supra note 55, at 58 (citing Vo v. Sup. Ct., 836 P.2d 408, 416 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), and the cases cited therein).  Recently, one of the cases cited in 
Vo in support of the born-alive rule, State v. Harbert, 758 P.2d 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1988) was overruled by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Hughes v. State, 
868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), thus reducing the number of jurisdictions that 
follow the born-alive rule to thirty-two. Id. 
 64. See George, supra note 48, at 761. 
 65. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979). 
 66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). 
 67. 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946). 
 68. Id. at 141. 
 69. See George, supra note 48, at 761. 
 70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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In Roe, the Supreme Court noted the disagreement among 
theologians, philosophers, and doctors regarding the point at which 
life begins,71 and held that, although the state has an interest in 
protecting the potential life a fetus represents in the third trimester of 
pregnancy, a fetus is not a person entitled to constitutional 
protections.72  In fact, the Court noted that if a fetus is a person then 
the appellant’s case “collapses.”73  The Roe decision developed the 
trimester approach by holding that in the first two trimesters, the 
woman’s right to privacy outweighs the state’s interest in the potential 
life the unborn child represents.74  In the third trimester, however, 
states can regulate or prohibit abortion except in cases where the 
woman’s life is in danger, because the Court found that the state’s 
interest in the potential life is very strong, but not stronger than the 
existing life of the mother.75  Thus, the interest of the life in being, 
the pregnant woman, is always paramount to the potential life of the 
unborn child. 
Nearly two decades later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a more 
conservative Court weakened the Roe ruling by substituting an 
“undue burden test” for the trimester approach established in Roe, 
but still did not claim that a fetus is a child or a person entitled to 
constitutional protection.76  On the contrary, the majority opinion 
underlined the view that the unborn are not legally deemed persons 
until after birth, when it noted that Roe clearly speaks to the state’s 
interest in “potential” life.77  The Court specifically relied on the 
doctrine of stare decisis, the need to follow and respect precedent, in 
not overruling Roe despite the anticipation that the Court would use 
the opportunity presented in Casey to overturn Roe.78  However, the 
Court in Casey noted that certain circumstances, including “whether 
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have 
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification” would 
warrant the overruling of prior cases.79  At that time, the Court did 
                                                          
 71. See id. at 156 (holding that the judiciary is also not in a position to decide 
when life begins). 
 72. See id. at 158-59. 
 73. See id. at 156-57. 
 74. See id at 162-65 (allowing the state, during the second trimester, to regulate 
abortion procedures that promote maternal health). 
 75. See id. at 162-65 (finding that a woman’s right to privacy is not absolute). 
 76. 505 U.S. 833, 873-74 (1992) (concluding that the trimester framework was not 
part of Roe’s essential holding). 
 77. Id. at 871. 
 78. See id. at 853 (citing also to a woman’s “individual liberty” to uphold the 
central holding of Roe). 
 79. Id. at 854-55. 
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not find such a determinative change in facts to exist.80  Thus, in 
order to justify overruling Roe, abortion opponents would need to 
show a change in facts meriting overturning the Court’s previous 
decision. 
In 1975, the Supreme Court in Burns v. Alcala,81 reinforced the 
precedent that the unborn are not children when it used a plain 
meaning approach and held that the term “dependent child” as used 
in the Social Security Act82 does not include unborn children.83  
Thus, while courts have afforded the unborn various levels of rights 
and protections in the areas of criminal law, property law, 
constitutional law, and tort law, these rights have been based on the 
potential life the unborn represents or subsequently achieves, and not 
by elevating the unborn to the same status as living children. 84  At 
most, the Supreme Court recognizes that states have an interest in the 
potential life of a fetus, but no such protected interest has been 
provided for a fertilized egg or an embryo.  If the Bush 
Administration simply wanted to extend SCHIP benefits to the 
unborn without making a political statement, it could have extended 
coverage to fetuses and embryos rather than redefining “child.” 
C.  Legislative Treatment of the Unborn 
State and federal legislators have also grappled with what rights to 
afford the unborn.  Their struggles are not reflected by the lack of a 
comprehensive treatment of the unborn, but rather the varying 
recognition of rights on a state-by-state, area-by-area, basis.85  Under 
traditional tort law, neither the fetus nor its family could maintain a 
cause of action for injuries suffered in utero.86  Today, however, a 
majority of states have statutes that include children injured in utero 
as “persons” for purposes of their wrongful death statutes.87  In 
                                                          
 80. See id. at 860 (determining that despite some factual changes since Roe, such 
as an earlier point of viability due to medical advances, the changes have no bearing 
on the validity of the central holding of Roe). 
 81. 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1975). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (West 2003). 
 83. 420 U.S. at 578. 
 84. See Linton, supra note 55, at 64 (noting that courts have used Roe to reject 
civil rights claims of the unborn under 42 U.S.C. §1983). 
 85. See generally Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and Legal 
Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 703 (1999) (discussing 
the process of various state and federal legislators in granting rights to unborn 
children). 
 86. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 131 (Cal. 1977) (denying tort 
recovery of stillborn fetus for wrongful death). 
 87. Mamta K. Shah, Inconsistencies in the Legal Status of an Unborn Child: 
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addition, fourteen states recognize unborn children as victims under 
their homicide laws throughout the gestation period,88 and one-third 
of the states have statutes, which make it a homicide to kill an unborn 
child regardless of the stage of pregnancy.89  Other states, such as 
Arkansas, have redefined “person” under their homicide laws to 
include a fetus beyond twelve weeks of conception,90 and some states, 
such as Louisiana, have gone so far as to recognize life as beginning at 
conception.91  States have also attempted to use tort law to restrict 
abortion rights by prohibiting claims for wrongful birth actions.92  
Thus, treatment of the unborn by the state legislatures ranges from 
recognizing conception as the beginning of life to providing limited 
rights to the unborn. 
The United States Congress has addressed the treatment of the 
unborn.  Congress has prohibited federal funding for research 
involving non-viable fetuses or fetuses whose viability is not yet 
ascertained, unless the research will enhance the health or well-being 
of the fetus.93  Recently, the House of Representatives debated the 
“Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004”, House Bill 1997, which it 
passed on February 26, 2004.94  The Senate, which had failed to vote 
on the Bill twice before when introduced in previous years, also 
passed the Bill on March 25, 2004.95  The law, dubbed “Laci and 
Conner’s Law,”96 creates a separate federal crime for any injury or 
death caused to an unborn child by a third party while committing a 
                                                          
Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 931, 939 (2001). 
 88. These states include: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN §13-11-03 (West 1989)), 
Idaho (IDAHO CODE §18-4001(2002)), and Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 38 ¶9-1.2, ¶9-
2.1,¶9-3.2 (Smith-Hurd 2003)). 
 89. See Linton, supra note 55, at 60. 
 90. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a)(b) (2003). 
 91. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 (West 1999). 
 92. See generally A.J. Stone, III, Article, Tort Law as an End Run Around 
Abortion Rights After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 471 (2000) (discussing two states’ legislation prohibiting wrongful birth claims). 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 289g (2003). 
 94. H.R. 1997, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004).  The House passed this bill twice 
previously, in 1999 and 2001.  See H.R. 503, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).  However, 
the Senate never acted on the 1999 and 2001 bills.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Washington 
Talk: From CNN to Congress, Legislation by Anecdote, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at 
A26. 
 95. Senate Passes Unborn Victims Bill, FOX NEWS CHANNEL, March 26, 2004, 
(reporting that the Senate passed the identical bill that the House passed), available 
at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,115189,00.html. 
 96. See H.R. 1997 (noting the short title of the Bill); see also Senate Passes 
Unborn Victims Bill, supra note 95 (explaining the Bill was named after Laci 
Peterson, a California woman who was murdered and her unborn son, who was to be 
named Conner). 
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federal offense against the pregnant woman.97  This bill, like other 
“feticide” laws, was intended to punish those who cause great harm or 
death to unborn children.98  Importantly, this law grants the unborn 
child the same status as living children by making it a separate offense 
for harm to the child in utero.99 
Until the recent passage of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 
2004, legal and legislative precedent is clear that any protections or 
rights the unborn have are predicated on their status as potential life 
and not as existing children.100  HHS’s decision to include the 
unborn as children is a bold step into the much debated question of 
when life begins, and may very well be one of a series of calculated 
steps geared to changing the way our government, our country, and 
our courts consider and treat the unborn.  The Court in Roe 
specifically referenced the lack of agreement among theologians, 
philosophers and doctors regarding when life begins in devising their 
trimester approach.  In fact, the Court specifically noted that if the 
fetus is a person, the case would have been decided differently.101 
Thus, HHS’s changing the definition of child, in the medical 
insurance arena no less, to include the unborn could be just the type 
of evidence the Casey Court indicated it would need to find; “a 
change in facts;” warranting the decision that life begins at 
conception and therefore justifying the overturning of Roe. 
III.  WHY THE NEW DEFINITION FAILS TO ACHIEVE THE STATED GOALS 
In addition to entering the controversial debate regarding when life 
begins, the expansion of SCHIP coverage without providing 
additional funding is doomed to fail for economic and practical 
                                                          
 97. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, § 
1841(a)(1), 118 Stat. 568 (2004) (signed into law by President Bush on April 1, 
2004). 
 98. See 150 CONG. REC. S3125 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
DeWine) (stating that the Bill is about “simple justice” by “recognize[ing] when 
someone attacks and harms a mother and her unborn child that attack does in fact 
result in two separate victims: the mother and her child.”). 
 99. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 § 1841(a)(1) . 
 100. Critics of the Unborn Victims of Violence Act note that this law could have 
serious implications on women’s rights.  Senator Feinstein of California, who 
authored an amendment that was defeated keeping an attack on a pregnant woman a 
single-victim offense, stated, “If this result is incorporated, it will be the first step in 
removing a woman’s right to choice.”  Senate Passes Unborn Victims Bill, supra note 
95.  But see Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 § 1841(c)(1)-(2) (expressly 
stating that the provisions of the law do not apply to abortion by consent or to any 
medical treatment to the pregnant woman or her unborn child). 
 101. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (noting that considering the 
fetus as a person would defeat Roe’s claim, as the fetus’ life would then be protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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reasons.  The bleak economic situation, which is facing the federal 
SCHIP funding and the state budgets, in combination with SCHIP’s 
awkward configuration pitting the interests of the women against their 
unborn children, creates a bind for states seeking to expand prenatal 
care. 
A.  Lack of Funding Will Prevent Meaningful Expansion of SCHIP 
Benefits to Include Unborn Children 
As discussed in Section II, the expansion of the definition of “child” 
to cover the unborn comes at a time when, due to economic woes, 
almost every state is in “fiscal crisis.”102  In fact, the National 
Governor’s Association stated that “state budgets are in their worst 
shape since WWII.”103  Under this crisis situation, many states must 
restrict their current SCHIP coverage.104  Thus, even if the intent of 
the change was to increase the number of people eligible for coverage 
under SCHIP, due to state budget shortfalls and federal reductions in 
matching funds, it is unlikely that many states will actually be able to 
expand their coverage to include prenatal care.  Sharon Carte, 
director of West Virginia’s SCHIP program, noted that the new 
regulation will not help cover any pregnant women in West Virginia 
because the state’s spending is already stretched as far as it can go 
trying to cover the previously eligible children.105 
Representatives of the SCHIP programs in New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, share Carte’s belief that 
due to tight constraints on the state budgets this change will not 
increase coverage.106  Lori Real, the Medicaid director in New 
Hampshire’s Department of Health and Human Services, pointed out 
that states would need to come up with about 35% of their own funds 
to expand their SCHIP coverage to include unborn children, 
something they cannot do under current budget constraints.107  
Some states, such as Texas, are already facing a funding gap in SCHIP 
                                                          
 102. Robert Tanner, Republican Governors Lament Lag in Security: Needs are 
Pressing, but Funds Limited, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 24, 2002, at A11. 
 103. Eun-Kyung Kim, States Face Bleakest Budgets in Decades; Many Legislatures 
are Turning to Tax Increases to Replenish Depleted Coffers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 
26, 2002, at A4. 
 104. Oklahoma, facing severe budget shortfalls, has greatly reduced the number of 
SCHIP eligible children in the state by changing the eligibility requirements from 
185% above the federal poverty level to 115%.  See LAW, supra note 32, at 2. 
 105. See Miller, supra note 5, at P2A (noting that the state will have to use unused 
funds from previous years to meet its coverage needs for 20,000 enrolled children). 
 106. Jim Geraghty, State Health Care Providers Doubt Big Changes From Bush 
Prenatal Care Proposal, States News Service, October 2, 2002. 
 107. See id. 
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coverage in the tens of millions of dollars just trying to cover the 
previously eligible children.108  Citing budget deficits, ex-California 
Governor Gray Davis vetoed a $50 million item in the 2003 California 
state budget to extend California’s SCHIP coverage to 300,000 low-
income parents.109 
Other states noted that this change in the definition of “child” is 
unlikely to increase coverage in their states because they already had 
programs in place to provide prenatal care.110  Thus, by not creating 
any new funding for SCHIP, this change creates the potential for new 
members to a program that is already at the breaking point. 
B.  HHS’s Change in its Regulation Creates a Conflict of Interest 
Between the Woman and her Unborn Child 
Even if funding were available in some states to increase the SCHIP 
program to cover unborn children, the new regulation sets up a 
conflict of interest between the pregnant woman and her unborn 
child, which may prevent women from seeking coverage under the 
program and also may inhibit a physician’s ability to provide proper 
care.  HHS was clear in its proclamation that the coverage extends to 
the unborn child only, not to the pregnant woman, unless she is 
under age nineteen and thus also considered a child.111  The 
irrationality of this selective coverage is emphasized by the fact that 
HHS expressly stated that the pregnant woman is not entitled to 
coverage for any care after the birth of the child.112  Therefore, as 
soon as the child enters the world, the woman is on her own.  Thus, 
the patient to whom the doctor owes his or her duty of care is clearly 
the unborn child and not the pregnant woman.  This situation begs 
the question: how are doctors to treat the unborn child without also 
treating the pregnant woman?  This may not be a problem in areas 
where the pregnant woman acquiesces to the doctor’s recommended 
prenatal treatment; but how are doctors to behave when the interests 
of the pregnant woman and the interests of the unborn child conflict, 
                                                          
 108. Gary Susswein, Texas Budget Facing Strain of Foster Care; Additional $62 
Million Needed as Bad News Buffets State’s Finances, AUSTIN-AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 30, 
2002, at B1 (reporting that Texas’ need for additional funding will increase its 
payments nearly 9%). 
 109. Pear, supra note 27, at A1. 
 110. See Geraghty, supra note 106. 
 111. See 67 Fed. Reg. 61,956 (2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 457) (stating that 
“while a pregnant woman under age 19 could be eligible as a targeted low-income 
child and benefit, a pregnant woman over age 19 would not”). 
 112. See id. at 61,969 (stating that coverage is only available “during the period 
from conception to birth”). 
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or the woman wishes to pursue an alternate plan of treatment or 
forego treatment altogether? 
The law is unclear on this point.  Although it is well established that 
a competent adult has the right to refuse medical treatment, when 
that competent adult is a pregnant woman, the law becomes less 
clear.113  In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, the 
Supreme Court relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to hold that an individual has a right to preserve his or 
her own bodily integrity by avoiding an unwanted medical 
procedure.114  This right has cultivated the doctrine of informed 
consent, which means that doctors must inform their patients of all 
risks associated with contemplated procedures and then give the 
patient the option of having or not having the procedure.115  Justice 
Cardozo articulated the strength of this right: “Every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient’s consent committed an assault for which he is 
liable in damages.”116 
The Supreme Court has also held that a woman does not relinquish 
her right to personal autonomy when she becomes pregnant.117  In 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists,118 the Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania statute 
which forced a trade-off between the pregnant woman’s health and 
the survival of the fetus was unconstitutional.119 Similarly, in a recent 
decision, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, a case involving a law aimed 
at preventing substance abuse among pregnant women, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the interests of women not to be subject to 
unreasonable searches and seizures outweighed the interests of the 
state in protecting unborn children from the pregnant woman’s 
                                                          
 113. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 
(1990) (holding that “an incompetent person” is “unable to make an informed and 
voluntary choice to exercise” the right to refuse such treatment); see also Bradley J. 
Glass, A Comparative Analysis of the Right of a Pregnant Woman to Refuse Medical 
Treatment for Herself and Her Viable Fetus: The United States and The United 
Kingdom, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 507, 509 (2001) (commenting that British 
courts “operate on the legal principle that each individual’s body is inviolate unless 
the individual consents [to a medical procedure]”). 
 114. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
 115. Alan Meisel et al., Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed 
Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCH. 285, 286-87 (1977). 
 116. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914). 
 117. See Glass, supra note 113, at 512. 
 118. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 119. Id. at 768-69. 
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substance abuse.120  In Ferguson, the Court addressed a conflict of 
interest between the pregnant woman and her unborn child and held 
that the pregnant woman’s constitutional right under the Fourth 
Amendment to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures is more 
important than the need to protect unborn children from the 
pregnant woman’s drug addiction.121  These rulings seem to indicate 
that the woman’s interest shall trump the state’s interest when 
medical decisions are at issue. 
In addition, there are no state laws providing courts with 
jurisdiction to hear cases where a pregnant woman refuses to undergo 
medical treatments, even when her refusal may jeopardize the well-
being of the fetus.122  All states currently have laws preventing child 
abuse and neglect, however, and the applicability of these laws to 
actions taken by a pregnant woman would hinge on whether the fetus 
is classified as a child.123  Some states, such as New Jersey, have 
expressly incorporated a fetus as covered by their child abuse laws.124  
Thus, the question remains whether foregoing recommended 
prenatal medical treatment could be actionable child abuse or 
neglect. 
Despite the lack of jurisdiction to hear such cases, doctors have 
successfully obtained court intervention in order to subject a pregnant 
woman to a medical procedure which she has objected to but the 
doctor believed to be in the best interests of the unborn child.125  In 
fact, the Kolder study done in 1987, found that in twenty-one cases 
where court orders were sought to override the wishes of the pregnant 
woman on behalf of the fetus, the orders were granted in 86% 
(seventeen) of the cases.126 
There are two main schools of thought concerning court ordered 
medical intervention over the objections of the pregnant woman.  
The first school, the majority approach, claims to give absolute 
                                                          
 120. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 121. Id. at 82-86. 
 122. Pamela Harris, Note, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: 
The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 150 (2001) 
(arguing that the law should honor a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment 
because it is a more ethical and legally appropriate alternative). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-11 (West 1981). 
 125. See Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1192, 1192 (1987) (finding that typically this has been done 
regarding cesarean sections); see generally Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Hosp. v. 
Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964) (ordering a blood transfusion despite the 
pregnant woman’s religious objections). 
 126. See Kolder et al., supra note 125, at 1192. 
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deference to a woman’s choice regarding health care.127  The other 
school, the minority view, balances the rights of the pregnant woman 
against those of the fetus and when treatment is deemed beneficial to 
both or not too intrusive for the pregnant woman, is ordered by the 
Court.128 
The American Medical Association has noted that in no other 
circumstance is a patient forced to undergo medical treatments for 
the benefit of another129 and recommends that courts honor the 
pregnant woman’s choice unless there are exceptional 
circumstances.130  It is unclear, however, exactly what would be an 
exceptional circumstance.  Even courts subscribing to the majority 
view, however, have ordered medical intervention over a woman’s 
wishes where the court found the procedure not to be too invasive.  
Such court-ordered “non-invasive” procedures have included cesarean 
sections or blood transfusions over the pregnant woman’s objections 
when the doctor believed the procedure to be in the best interests of 
the unborn child.131  If abdominal surgery is considered “non-
invasive,” it is difficult to imagine what some courts would exclude.  In 
addition, the court has ordered a pregnant woman to be held in 
custody in a prison hospital facility until after the birth of the child to 
ensure delivery of the child in a manner the court considered 
appropriate132 and also ordered a woman dying of cancer to 
prematurely deliver a baby over her objections.133  The Supreme 
                                                          
 127. See Glass, supra note 113, at 522 (comparing the rights of pregnant women to 
maintaining her own bodily integrity with the interests of the state). 
 128. See id. at 526-27. 
 129. See H.M. Cole, Legal Intervention during Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical 
Treatment and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 
264 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2663, 2664 (1990). 
 130. See Glass, supra note 113, at 521-22. 
 131. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 
(Ga. 1981) (ordering Caesarian section over objections of mother who opposed 
operation and blood transfusions on religious grounds); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 
N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that the woman’s interest in exercising 
her religious beliefs was not enough to override the interests of the state in protecting 
the fetus); Crouse v. Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1985) (allowing the hospital to administer a blood transfusion to the mother and 
child against the mother’s objections); Cole, supra note 129; Kolder et al., supra note 
125, at 1192 (finding that typically this has been done regarding cesarean sections); 
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (1964) (holding that a 
pregnant woman must have a blood transfusion despite her religious objections). 
 132. Brian MacQuarrie & Richard Higgins, Attleboro Sect Member Gives Birth 
State Custody Seen; Court Hearing Is Set, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2000, at B1; see 
also Marilyn L. Miller, Fetal Neglect and State Intervention: Preventing Another 
Attleboro Cult Baby Death, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 71 (2001) (discussing the case of 
Rebecca Corneau who was held in custody because she refused a prenatal medical 
examination on religious grounds). 
 133. See generally In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (discussing the death of 
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Court has, however, struck down laws that required a woman to accept 
an increased medical risk to save a viable fetus134 and to undergo a 
mini-cesarean section because it offered the best opportunity for the 
fetus to be born alive.135  It is important to note that all of these cases 
occurred in a context where the mother was the primary patient and 
it is therefore reasonable to assume that the doctor and the court may 
have a more compelling reason to intervene over the objections of the 
woman than where the unborn child is the primary patient.  Thus, the 
current regulation places women and doctors in the awkward position 
of not knowing how to proceed in a situation where the doctor may 
be treating and interacting with the woman but be primarily 
concerned about and interested in the unborn child.  Given the lack 
of clear guidance from the courts, a woman’s fear that the doctor may 
order or subject her to medical procedures she does not wish to have, 
but the doctor deems to be in the best interests of the unborn patient, 
may be enough to prevent her from seeking the prenatal care the 
revision claims to provide.136  
IV. THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
President Bush made clear that the November 2002 midterm 
election was a mandate on his presidency and his ability to get things 
done so he heavily invested his time and energy in seeing that the 
Republicans held on to their majority in the House and regained the 
Senate.137  Thus the timing and place of the announcement of the 
change in HHS’s definition place it right in the middle of a highly 
charged political scene.  A Gallup Poll conducted during the month 
before the November 2002 election, found that the abortion issue was 
moderately to extremely important for 70% of voters in deciding how 
they would vote in the November 2002 election.138  In addition, the 
Bush Administration chose to announce the change during a speech 
                                                          
both mother and baby within two days of the delivery procedure). 
 134. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,  
747 (1986). 
 135. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). 
 136. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1248 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), (noting that fear of 
being subject to a medical procedure to which she objects may prevent a woman from 
seeking the medial care she needs). 
 137. Bush, Cheney Raise Cash For Candidates, THE TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Oct. 
15, 2002, at A3 (detailing a fundraiser in Maryland designed to gain support for 
Republican Congressional candidates). 
 138. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion online, “How 
important will each of the following issues be to your vote for Congress this 
November (2002)– will it be – extremely important, very important, moderately 
important, or not that important?  How about abortion?” Gallup Organization, Sept. 
20-22, 2002. 
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given by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy 
Thompson, before the Conservative Political Action Committee as 
one of several examples of the Administration’s commitment to the 
unborn.139  Thus, the expanded definition was a clear reminder to 
anti-abortion activists that a Republican victory was important in the 
fight to overturn Roe.  The new provision also expands coverage to 
the unborn children of immigrants, regardless of the citizenship 
status of their parents, which is seen as a political outreach to the 
Hispanic vote at a time when the Republicans were attempting to woo 
them for the November election.140 
While providing health care for the uninsured working poor had 
not been a previous priority for the Bush Administration,141 
maintaining the support of the religious right and other abortion 
opponents has been a clear goal.142  In keeping with his goal of 
opposing abortion rights, Bush has appointed conservative pro-life 
advocate John Ashcroft as Attorney General.  On his first day in office 
and coincidentally the 28th anniversary of Roe, President Bush issued 
an executive order halting United States funding to international 
family planning groups that support abortion rights.143  Redefining 
children to include the unborn in the health context is another step 
towards changing facts warranting an overruling of Roe.  The Bush 
Administration has also stated that it is deeming the unborn fetus to 
be a “child.” This statement has been lauded by anti-abortion activists 
and condemned by pro-choice groups.144  Thus, the timing of the 
regulation combined with its effect of increasing the number of 
eligible recipients in a program that is already over capacity supports 
the view that it is a politically motivated change without the intention 
or likelihood of providing real medical benefits. 
                                                          
 139. See Tommy G. Thompson, Remarks at the Conservative Political Action 
Committee Conference (Jan. 31, 2002) (describing changes in the Department of 
Health and Human Services under the Bush Administration), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech/2002/020131.html. 
 140. See Times Wire Reports, Latino Voters Not of Single Mind, Poll Finds, Oct. 4, 
2002, at A22 (noting that Latino voters are likely to be unpredictable when it comes 
to core beliefs associated with either conservatives or liberals). 
 141. See Amy Goldstein, States’ Budget Woes Fuel Medicaid Cuts; Poor Lose 
Coverage and Services, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2002, at A1 (noting that many former 
welfare recipients are also losing Medicaid benefits). 
 142. Alexandra Starr, Enough With The Rhetoric, The Right Wants Results, BUS. 
WK, Feb. 10, 2003, at 43 (noting that balancing both conservative and moderate social 
goals is a priority of the Bush Administration). 
 143. See Swift Action by Bush, ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 23, 2001, available at 
http://abcnewsgo.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/bush-abortionrights. 
 144. See Ralph Ranalli, Bush Plan On Fetus Sparks Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 
30, 2002, at B3 (describing the adverse reaction to Bush’s prenatal care plan among 
liberal voters in Massachusetts). 
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IV.  THERE ARE BETTER WAYS TO PROVIDE PRENATAL COVERAGE 
Providing prenatal health insurance coverage to all pregnant 
women is an important health benefit that the Bush Administration 
should seek to provide.  Studies link the absence of prenatal health 
insurance, and thus the lack of health care, to higher infant mortality 
rates.145  Currently, the United States ranks 28th in the world with an 
infant mortality rate of 6.8 deaths per 1000 live births.146  There is 
obviously room for improvement.  Thus, HHS should seek legitimate 
ways to provide prenatal health insurance coverage to those not 
covered by Medicaid or private health insurance.  The current action 
falls short by its lack of funding and its structural problems.  This 
coverage could have been provided by speeding up the current waiver 
program, giving more funding to the SCHIP program, preventing the 
SCHIP dip, preventing the reversion to the federal treasury of the 
unused SCHIP funds, or creating a new program geared specifically 
toward providing prenatal care for uninsured pregnant women. 
In keeping with the regulation’s provisions for providing prenatal 
care, nine states had already obtained waivers from the Secretary of 
HHS under Section 1115 of SCHIP, to cover parents or pregnant 
women fitting the income criteria, as well as their children.147  
Arizona, California (not implemented by the state but approved by 
HHS), Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio (not implemented by the State 
but approved by HHS), and Wisconsin all obtained waivers from HHS 
to cover parents of SCHIP recipients.148  Such family coverage, of 
course, is included in prenatal care.  While Colorado, New Jersey, and 
Rhode Island specifically obtained permission to cover pregnant 
women who are not eligible for Medicaid using SCHIP funds.149 At 
the writing of this article, Arkansas and Maryland also had requests 
pending with HHS to provide such coverage.150 
HHS notes that the new definition of child will enable states to 
cover unborn children in a few weeks or months, as opposed to the 
                                                          
 145. See Jim Weill, The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Well-Being 
of America’s Children, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY L. & POL’Y 257, 259 (1998) 
(discussing American attitudes towards the needs of children). 
 146. Faststats Infant Deaths/Mortality, National Center for Health Statistics, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/infmort.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2003). 
 147. Andeen, supra note 12, at 324-25; State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services CMSO, FCHPG, Division of 
State Children’s Health Insurance (DSCHI) [hereinafter State Children’s], at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/stateplans/waivers/1115waivers.pdf (last visited Apr. 
6, 2004). 
 148. See State Children’s, supra note 147, at 1-4. 
 149. See Press Release, supra note 28. 
 150. See State Children’s, supra note 147, at 5-6. 
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previous waiver procedure, which HHS claims could take three to six 
months.151  However, the figures provided by HHS show that some 
states had their waivers approved as quickly as eight days (California), 
while the longest wait was five months (Minnesota).152  Eight days is a 
not very long period of waiting time, and shows that HHS can process 
these waivers quickly.  If HHS were truly concerned about the speed 
of approving the waivers, it seems that the easier solution would be 
simply to implement an internal program which would allow HHS to 
more quickly grant the waiver requests to states to cover pregnant 
women, or to make the waiver process easier.  Once the waiver is 
obtained, the woman as well as the unborn child would be covered 
which would eliminate the conflict of interest problems discussed 
above in section II(A). 
Furthermore, under the new definition of child, states must rewrite 
their current programs to define the additional type of coverage, if 
any, that will be available for this new subset of children.  Thus, the 
new regulation does not automatically provide prenatal care.  
Rewriting state insurance coverage policies is hardly a quick and 
simple process.  Some states have already said that due to funding 
shortfalls they already are unable to continue funding for the 
currently covered children,153 so it is questionable whether states will 
be able to cover any unborn children, and if they do, it may very well 
come at the expense of older children. 
In the alternative, HHS could have proposed a new program aimed 
specifically at providing prenatal care to pregnant women and their 
unborn children, who need it and are unable to afford it.  Such a 
program would need to provide its own funding, and thus would not 
be competing with the already thinly stretched SCHIP funds.  It would 
also cover both the woman and the child, thereby avoiding a conflict 
of interest problem.  In addition, if the Bush Administration believes 
the best option is to provide coverage under the scope of SCHIP, it 
should aggressively support the bills introduced in Congress to 
prevent the “SCHIP Dip,” and the return of unused funds to the 
United States Treasury.  Each of these suggested methods would
                                                          
 151. See Kemper, supra note 46, at A23, (quoting HHS spokesman Bill Pierce 
stating that the new regulation extends citizenship to all children born in the U.S. 
regardless of the immigration status of the mother). 
 152. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SRVS., STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE 
PROGRAM ANNUAL ENROLLMENT REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2001: OCTOBER 1, 2000-SEPTEMBER 
30, 2001 (2002), at http://www.cms-hhs.gov/schip/enrollment/schip01.pdf (last 
visited July 30, 2002). 
 153. See infra part III(A). 
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provide the needed prenatal care, without entering the legal 
quagmire of when life begins. 
CONCLUSION 
Prenatal care is an important public health benefit, which the 
United States should strive to provide for all pregnant women.  The 
Bush Administration’s rewriting of SCHIP’s definition of child to 
include fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses, regardless of the 
pregnant woman’s immigration status, is a bold foray into the legal 
quagmire of abortion rights and the question of when life begins. The 
new definition further fails to provide any real steps toward improving 
prenatal coverage for those who need it.  The regulation’s failure to 
provide additional funding, and the built-in conflict of interest 
between the pregnant woman and the unborn child make it little 
more than political and legal ammunition for abortion opponents to 
overturn Roe, rather than a legitimate policy aimed at providing 
prenatal care for women and their unborn children. 
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